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Child In Conflict with Law Through His Mother vs The State of Karnataka on 7 May 2024
Facts:
1. An FIR was lodged against the juvenile (Child in Conflict with Law or CCL) for
offences under S.376(i), 342 IPC, and S. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act (POSCO), 2012. On 09.11.2021, after his
apprehension on 03.11.2021, and his production before the Board, he was released on
bail.
2. On 05.04.2022, the Principal Magistrate of the Board passed an order holding that the
CCL is to be tried as an adult by the Children’s Court as per the preliminary
assessment report and the social investigation report. The record was directed to be
transferred to the Court concerned. However, a dissenting member did not sign this
order, which led to an adjournment 1 .
3. On 12.04.2022, without the Principal Magistrate's presence, two Board members
reversed the earlier decision and passed an order directing the inquiry to remain under
the Board's jurisdiction as a juvenile case.
4. The Board's subsequent order on 10.04.2023, dismissed the complainant’s (victim’s
mother) application to terminate proceedings and transferred the case to the Children's
Court.
5. The High Court later set aside this order, directing the Board to retransfer the case to
the Children's Court. The CCL appealed this decision to the Supreme Court
challenging procedural irregularities and timelines in conducting the preliminary
assessment.
Issues:
1. Whether the timeline under S.14(3) for completing preliminary assessments
mandatory or directory 2 ?
2. Whether the terms “Children’s Court” and “Court of Sessions” be used
interchangeably under the Act?
3. What is the appropriate appellate period under S.101 for challenging Board decisions?
4. Whether the adjournment orders and the reasons for such delays be explicitly
recorded 3 ?
Appellant's argument:
1. Learned senior counsel appearing for the CCL, submitted that the practice of passing
orders while stating that the reasons would follow had been deprecated by this Court.
It deprived the party of his appropriate remedy when no reasons were available. In the
case at hand, firstly the Principal Magistrate mentioned that the order was passed by
him and another Member of the Board whereby the Board’s member did not sign the
same and only mentioned that he disagreed with the views of the Principal Magistrate
and would pass a detailed order on the next date. In support of the arguments,
reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Balaji Baliram Mupade and
Another v. State of Maharashtra and Others (2021) 12 SCC 603 4 .
2. It was submitted that an assessment under S.15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 did not envisage the passing of an order. It was
merely a satisfaction recorded, and there was no final satisfaction recorded by the
Board. No order had been passed under S.18(3) of the Act. Subsequent orders passed
by the Board showed that the inquiry had already commenced and it was at a later
stage that the complainant applied for termination of proceedings before the Board,
which was dismissed on 10.04.2023. The order was appealable under S.101(1) of the
Act. However, no appeal was filed. A revision was filed before the High Court under
S.397 read with S.399 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 which was not maintainable 5 .
3. It was further argued that under S.14(3) of the Act preliminary assessment under
S.15 thereof, had to be made within 3 months from the date of the first production of
CCL before the Board. In the case at hand, the child was produced before the Board
for the first time on 03.11.2021 and the period of three months expired on 02.02.2022.
The result thereof was that the CCL was to be tried by the Board and no order for his
trial by the Children's Court could be passed thereafter.
4. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master
Bholu & Anr. 2022 INSC 716: (2022) 10 SCR 595 to submit that the Court opined
that the timelines provided for under the Act have to be adhered to. If the time
provided for preliminary assessment cannot be extended, no order for trial of the CCL
by the Children's Court could be passed 6 .
Respondent's argument:
1. Learned counsel for the State submitted that even after the matter is transferred to the
Children's Court by the Board for the trial of the CCL, it can be reconsidered by the
Children's Court under S.19(1) of the Act. Any order passed by the Children's Court is
appealable under S.101(5) of the Act. The scope of S.101(1) and 101(2) is different
where sub-section (1) deals with final orders, and sub-section (2) deals with the
preliminary assessment 7 .
2. It was further argued that merely because the proceedings under S.15 could not be
concluded within 3 months, by default the CCL would not be tried by the Board and
this provision cannot be held to be mandatory, as no consequence of such a default
has been provided in the Act. Even S.14(4) provides for the extension of time in case
the inquiry cannot be concluded within the time prescribed 8 .
3. It was further stated that S.15 provides for taking opinions from experienced
psychologists, psycho-social workers, or other experts. There could be intentional
delays caused in the process also to take benefit, as in the case in hand, the
investigating officer himself took about 2 months to get the report from NIMHANS.
In such a situation the Board could not be treated as powerless to extend the time for
reasons to be recorded.
4. It was further submitted that there was no merit in the arguments raised by the learned
counsel for the appellant, to give him liberty to challenge the order dated 05.04.2022
in case he had a grievance against the same. To give liberty to the appellant and to
raise the same before a lower authority would be an exercise in futility. The same
would rather result in delaying the process further. Therefore, the counsel prayed for
the dismissal of the appeal 9 .
Held:
The Court in this case divided the judgment into different parts and made the following
observations, as mentioned below:
1. S.14(3) of the Act, providing for 3 months for completion of a preliminary assessment
under S.15 of the Act, is not mandatory. The same is held to be a directory and the
said period can be extended, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, by the Chief
Judicial Magistrate or, as the case may be, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate 10 .
2. The words ‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of Sessions’ in the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the 2016 Rules shall be read
interchangeably. Primarily jurisdiction vests in the Children’s Court. However, in the
absence of such a Court in the district, the power to be exercised under the Act is
vested with the Court of Sessions 11 .
3. Appeal, under S.101(2) of the Act against an order of the Board passed under S.15 of
the Act, can be filed within 30 days. The appellate court can entertain the appeal after
the expiry of the aforesaid period, provided sufficient cause is shown.
4. The order passed by the Board on 05.04.2022 was final. However, the appellant shall
have the right to appeal against the aforesaid order within 10 days from the date of the
order and the appellate authority shall endeavour to decide the same within 2 months
from the date of filing 12 .
5. The Presiding Officers and/or Members while passing the order shall properly record
the presence of the parties and/or their counsels, the purpose for which the matter is
being adjourned and the party on whose behalf the adjournment has been sought and
granted.
6. Hence, the Court granted the remedy of appeal and held that the CCL could exercise
his right of appeal against the order dated 05.04.2022 passed by the Board within 10
days, and the appeal, if any filed, shall be decided by the appellate authority within
two months thereafter 13 .
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